

Army and Navy Chronicle, AND SCIENTIFIC REPOSITORY.

Wm. Q. Force, Editor and Proprietor.—\$5 per annum.—Office corner of 10th & D streets.

VOL. III.—No. 14.]

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 1844.

[WHOLE No. 65.]

Congressional Documents.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY.

Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, transmitting a copy of Commodore Stewart's letter, of date 23d March, 1842, relative to the organization of the navy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 1, 1844.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit, herewith, "a copy of the letter from Commodore Charles Stewart to the Secretary of the Navy, of the 23d of March, 1842, respecting the organization of the navy," in compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of January 29, 1844.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID HENSHAW.

Hon. JOHN W. JONES,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

U. S. FLAG SHIP INDEPENDENCE,
NEW YORK, March 23, 1842.

SIR: In accordance with the desire you expressed, when I had the honor of an interview with you, I will now endeavor to present some observations in relation to our naval service, which will, I hope, correspond with the views and principles you may have formed, and still cherish. The great desire you have evinced for the welfare of the martial arm over which you preside, and the convictions which you have so ably and so zealously proclaimed and enforced, of the necessity of fostering it, have been approved by the nation, and will go far to reanimate the service. You have succeeded in impressing the public attention with the high necessity of its thorough reorganization, which it now becomes of the greatest moment should be as complete as possible, under laws, rules, and regulations of the simplest and most efficient kind; for, if we look back to the emanations of this character from both ends of the Navy Department, for the last twenty-five years, we shall be astounded with the incongruous orders, the multiplicity of circulars, and the violations of law and rights, which have tended to arrest the development of our naval qualifications, and have almost paralyzed the energies of our officers.

By the establishment of the Board of Navy Commissioners, it was fondly hoped that, in compliance with the law, a uniformity in the respective classes of vessels would be obtained, and a concise code of regulations be established, which would secure econ-

omy throughout its civil administration, and devolve an effective responsibility on all persons therein engaged, and at all times. For this important post the most distinguished captains were generally selected, some of whom soon perceived that there was a wide difference between organizing, fighting, and controlling a ship of war, and the conducting, economizing, and regulating a whole establishment. Here has been the fruitful source of many of the evils under which our navy has labored. The want of individual responsibility; the absence of economy in the construction, equipment, and repairs of our ships; the diversity in their models, classes, and qualities; the incapacity of some, and the worthlessness of others; the excessive waste by continual experiments, have never perhaps been surpassed, if ever equalled, in any other naval establishment of the same limits. Vacillations, which ought never to have been tolerated, have prevailed; and instances have occurred where draughts and models have been made, approved, and adopted; the timber has been contracted for; but, before or after its delivery, these propensities of the board, or a change in some of its members, have begotten new views; another form and other dimensions have been then given to the vessel, which have required the frames of two to furnish the frame of the one to be built: thus, having only one ship at the expense of the frames of two originally intended; the residue of the timber becoming promiscuous, lumbering up the navy-yards, and probably rotting before a vessel of the form and dimensions it would suit was required. And in regard to their experiments in ordnance, I may here not inappropriately refer to the recent melancholy occurrence on board the steamer Fulton, [which] was caused by the attempt to convert a number of 42-pounders into 68-pounders, by "reaming up" or enlarging the calibre, under the expectation that the increased explosive shock of a 68-pounder could be sustained by a large reduction of metal from the cannon, which scarcely possessed a sufficient quantity for the purposes of a 42-pounder—resulting in the death and injury of several seamen, and diminishing their confidence in the security of naval armaments. It is unnecessary, however, that I should lengthen this letter with a detail of abuses; for I believe there is now a very general acquiescence in the opinion that the establishment of this board has failed to meet the expectations that were indulged by the service and the country, and that there exists now a disposition in the authorities to change the plan of its present organization.

Let it not be understood, however, from what I have said, that it is my intention to cast any reflection upon those who have, at different times, com-

posed the Board of Navy Commissioners, or to impute to them views designed for the injury of our common service; for they have generally been men of high professional attainments, and desirous of promoting the welfare of the navy. But I believe the error to be in the *system*, and that the law calls upon the officers of the board for *more* than their *profession* and *acquirements* enable them to perform with the expected judiciousness and economy. And permit me here to state, that, in my apprehension, that system only will be productive of the desired results, which shall have at all times competent and able agents to execute its requirements, individually responsible themselves to the head of the department, who himself, through the Chief Magistrate, shall be the subject of a sole and undivided responsibility to the nation. Although, by a classification of the duties now performed by the Board of Navy Commissioners, and their assignment to separate naval officers, as has been recommended by Mr. Paulding, the acts of each officer may be more clearly placed before the public view; it nevertheless becomes a matter of great doubt, in my mind, whether, in the *limited* number of the rank to which you must necessarily be confined for your selections, individuals can at all times be found of such talents, information, and accomplishments, as to be enabled to take the charge and control of the important and diversified branches of service required of them. By some of the resolutions of Congress, and various orders of the Executive department, it is evident that the capacities and acquirements of naval officers have been overrated. They have thus been diverted from their regular professional duties, and subjected to responsibilities to which they have been found unequal; consequently, failures have ensued, where the best results were anticipated. In saying this, I mean, of course, no disparagement to them. They may sustain our good character, abroad and at home, at all times: they may be expert and skillful seamen in peace, and be able bravely to vindicate the honor of our flag in war. But we must regard things as they are. When Congress shall choose to extend to the young officer of the navy those advantages which may be derived from a proper instruction, the force of these objections will be materially diminished.

The failure of the present system was evident to my mind at its organization; and I predicted it in a letter to the Hon. William Reed, chairman of the naval committee of the House of Representatives in 1814, who had invited me to give my opinion upon a plan for a navy board, at that time under the consideration of Congress. I therein stated, that, although when considered as an auxiliary to the department, it would relieve its head from much of the detail duties, which were too *extensive* and diversified for any one person to discharge with the necessary attention; yet that it would fail in placing our naval establishment on the best foundation, and in conducting it with the requisite economy in all its branches. In the year 1813, in reply to a letter from the Hon. Langdon Cheves, chairman of the naval committee, I had the honor to submit a plan for the reorganization of the Navy Department, such as the wants of the service seemed to me at that time to require.

The principal features in it were the placing *each* branch of the service under competent and responsible agents, and holding them accountable for all their expenditures and proceedings. The professional business of the department would then have been conducted by the following officers, who, I supposed, would have been sufficient for the duties required: a constructor general, a commissary general, a surgeon general, and a master of ordnance. These officers, who were each to have been fully conversant with the branch of service under his control, and who

need not necessarily have been selected from the navy, could have been *occasionally* joined by one or two experienced post captains—at such times constituting a board of navy commissioners, and assembling periodically, and just before the meeting of Congress, to prepare estimates for supplies, and for the discharge of other duties which might be committed to their care. A modification of this plan, adapting it to the many changes which have occurred since that period, in the augmentation of the navy, both in its *materiel* and *personnel*, and in the increased facilities for construction and repairs, would seem to me to answer all the purposes required. I would, therefore, recommend the establishment of the following bureaus:

1. A bureau for surveying and inspecting the navy.
2. A bureau for construction and repairs.
3. A bureau for the supervision and improvement of navy and dock yards, for the equipment of vessels of war, and the supply of boatswains', gunners', and carpenters' stores.
4. A bureau for ordnance and arms.
5. A bureau of medicine, surgery, and hospitals.
6. A bureau for the supply of provisions and purser's stores.

By this organization will be obtained all the professional information in every branch of the service that is desirable. For the first bureau will be required a naval officer, as a surveyor and inspector general of the navy, well known to the Government for his talents, skill, and efficiency as a seaman, and intimate acquaintance with vessels of war and maritime affairs; one who could be safely consulted on all occasions, on the employment of the naval forces; and one who should scrutinize closely into the qualifications of officers intended for particular service. He should inspect and survey every ship, in all her parts and equipment, with the eye of a commander, and be competent at once to detect any existing defect, or source of inefficiency, and point to the remedies. He should investigate, and critically examine, any new improvement, or other matter applicable to naval purposes, and present a faithful report thereon. This officer should preside when the heads of the other bureaus were assembled, and acting as a board of commissioners in their combined character. The charge of the second bureau should be committed to a constructor general of the navy, an individual fully conversant with the art and science of construction. He should be competent to examine into all improvements in this art, and report thereon authoritatively; he should be the best judge of the form and qualities to be given to every species of public vessel, and of the adaptation of them to the purposes for which they might be intended. He should also have the direction of all necessary repairs to vessels. At the head of the third bureau may be placed an active, intelligent, and experienced naval captain, who should have the supervision and control of the navy and dock yards, and who should direct the equipment of all vessels of war fitting out for sea, which equipment should be subject to the inspection of the chief of the first bureau, the surveyor and inspector general of the navy; and he should also have charge of the supplies of boatswains', gunners', and carpenters' stores. Over the fourth bureau should be placed a master of ordnance and arms, an individual who would be scientifically and practically conversant with these instruments of war, and on whom a reliance could be reposed for their efficiency and perfection, in order that the lives of valuable men might not be uselessly sacrificed, or our ships captured, and the honor of our flag tarnished from a defective armament. This would be an important bureau, and one which it would be difficult to fill

efficiently from the navy. Should a resort be necessary to the other arm of our defence, and an officer found fully competent, he might be transferred to a suitable rank in the marine corps, under the augmentation and improvement of that corps, which I shall allude to and suggest, and he would then be constituted one of the *personnel* of the navy. At the head of the fifth bureau would be required an *experienced naval surgeon*. The charge of the sixth bureau should be committed to an intelligent and faithful purser.

No perfection, however, is to be expected in our naval establishment, if incapable agents are placed over the control of the bureaux, and its general direction. I may be here permitted to observe, that many of its defects under the present organization are to be, in a great degree, attributed to the frequent change of the person placed at its head, who has often not been continued long enough in office to become acquainted with the nature of the naval service, and much less with the services and qualifications of officers. This system of things has led to injurious vacillations in the rules and regulations, to indiscriminate promotions, to rapid changes in the appointment and employment of officers; and opened the door to favoritism, invidious preferences, and injurious influences. I would here beg leave to observe, that the law establishing the navy board comprises some provisions—or perhaps I should say, leads to practices highly injurious to the service, such as that of subjecting senior captains to the orders and mandates of their juniors. The preservation of the rights appertaining to rank and seniority, is one of the first and *highest of military obligations*. If this be not observed, it will be *impossible* to keep unimpaired the *esprit du corps*, so indispensable to the well-being of a military service. An officer, in his reversed position, must feel that he has been much misplaced; and, although it may not carry with it any degradation or inconvenience to him, yet the observance of the orders and mandates of his junior cannot but diminish those kindly feelings for each other, so necessary to a mutual support when the hour of trial comes. In the heedless disregard of the rights attaching to those in military service, there is criminality; and the most beautiful and important attribute of power is the faithful guarding of them from violation. By conserving the rights of officers, so far as may be compatible with justice to the country, you elevate their pride and love of service; whereas, by a disregard of their rights, you render them a spiritless body, and sink them below the noble aspirations by which they should always be distinguished.

The system of razeing ships-of-the-line, lately introduced into the navy, appears to involve consequences calculated to impair its *efficiency*, and is at variance with the principles of economy. Large appropriations have been made for the purpose of building 74-gun ships, and, if some of them are defective in carrying their guns too low, there must certainly be other and better remedies; and I believe there are instances in both the English and French navies, where, by “furring out” or spreading the bottoms, and giving new bearings and increased buoyancy, the lower battery of the ships has been rendered sufficiently high to be effective. This mode, I should think, would be preferable to that of cutting down the costly structure of a line-of-battle ship to a defective *nondescript* frigate—defective, because her principal and most efficient battery is opened to the fire of an enemy's small arms; the men there stationed are liable to be killed or crippled, and the fire of the cannon impeded by the fall of spars, rigging, blocks, or anything that may be shot away or fall from aloft. The rigging being worked on that deck, the battery must, generally, cease its fire

when any manœuvring takes place; and it is often on those occasions when its fire would be of most avail, from a favorable position. The marines, unless placed on the poop-deck, where there are no bulwarks to cover them, must use their muskets through the port-holes. This would inevitably lead to injurious explosions at the time the cannon are being loaded with powder. In addition, there are the heavy hull, spars, sails, and rigging of a 74-gun ship, to be managed with a reduced crew, or that of a large frigate. In fine, not to mention other defects, they constitute that kind of vessel which neither possesses the celerity of the frigate, nor the force of the line-of-battle ship; and I believe the same description that was found so incompetent for the purposes of either, that it was exploded after the war of 1756—a model of one of which is now to be found in the Philadelphia navy-yard.

Under this disposition to raze our ships-of-the-line, I apprehend that a disinclination in Congress to construct others to replace them will arise, and which, I fear, will leave us, in a few years, destitute of a naval force of that class best calculated to meet the heavy ships of an enemy; for, so long as other powers constitute their marines of the several existing kinds of vessels, we *must* meet them with similar ships. It may prove a very fatal idea to suppose that our navy can go on increasing in the smaller vessels of war, without a corresponding increase in the larger ships. Should such be the rule of augmentation, your cruisers would be incapable of coping with the more powerful vessels of an enemy, and would be forced to remain blockaded, and unable to get to sea. If, however, they should succeed in leaving port, through the remissness or insufficiency of a blockading force, they will finally meet the *same* fate which befel nearly all of our small vessels in the late war—that of being added to the navy of the enemy. And thus, in either contingency, would your antagonist have a complete control over the coast, and be capable of inflicting annoyances and injuries along the entire seaboard, which, experience assures us, have occurred before.

It is true, a new engine of war has been found in steamers, and which may prove a highly important auxiliary in harbor defence, and likewise hereafter in the operations of fleets. At present, however, they are incapable of the protracted cruises, the power of endurance, and the concentrated weight of fire, by which ships-of-the-line are enabled to contend with each other, and especially with permanent land-batteries—qualities so *essential* to a naval force. They are imperfect in model, armament, and capacity to carry fuel for the length of time which other ships could sustain themselves at sea. But, in consequence of the great improvements continually occurring, the time may arrive when this kind of vessel will be found so essential, that I apprehend no fleet of importance will put to sea without them, and yet not incur the hazard of falling a prey to an inferior one which possesses them. They would, then, constitute at sea what the flying artillery is on land. With them, an enemy might be approached without fear, and reconnoitred with certainty. They would become the repeaters or telegraphs of the whole fleet. In time of action, they would aid ships-of-the-line to *get into position*; and, like the light cavalry in an army, they would cut off all retreat of the worsted party, intercept flying adversaries, and prevent their escape. Even now, at the present day, I am not prepared to say whether their advantages would not be so great to a fleet, in time of war, as to render it important for each vessel to carry a portion of the fuel intended for their use, or the employment of fast-sailing colliers for that purpose.

But, so far as regards the defence of the coast, bays, and our harbors, they will at once constitute

an important portion of the force necessary to be maintained, at all times, for that purpose. You have presented this subject so forcibly and judiciously to the public eye, in your late annual report, that there can scarcely remain any longer an excuse for omitting the necessary preparations. Our country is peculiarly situated in many respects. It has an immense seacoast to protect, which is indented with innumerable rivers, bays, and harbors, of every diversity of form, depth of water, and extent. The great advantage of steamers, in contributing to the defence of these exposed and extensive borders, must be apparent to every one; and, on account of that highly important and valuable portion of our country which borders on the Gulf of Mexico being entirely severed (so far as regards naval operations) from the Atlantic coast, a large proportion of this species of vessels is imperatively required. Great diversity of opinion prevails, however, with respect to their form, size, the materials of their construction, their armament, and the mode of their propulsion. I would suggest, as the most judicious mode of settling these points, to confide the whole subject to the critical examination of a discreet and intelligent person, actuated by the high considerations of patriotism, and with no other object to subserve than the advancement of the public interests.

In connection with the defence of our harbors, and the employment of steam-vessels as auxiliary to that purpose, an increase of the marine corps, together with their instruction in field and artillery exercise, is urgently demanded. This corps has been laboring under many disadvantages, on account of the smallness of its number. They have at all times been dispersed and cut up into small detachments and portions for ships, navy yards, &c., so that a full company has scarcely ever been embodied at any place; consequently, they have been deficient in field manoeuvres and drill. Thus deprived of the requisite instruction, have they been supplied to ships, to the naval depots, or to the headquarters, continually being recruited and transported from place to place, and station to station, for the purpose of these supplies, until the *contingent expenses* consequent thereon would almost support an additional regiment. And such have been their deficiencies in skill and military exercises, that many of the naval commanders were under the belief, at one period, that their ships would be stronger without them; in consequence of which, an effort was made, in the Senate of the United States, to suppress the corps. (See the call made upon the naval captains, by the resolution of March 1, 1830.)

But, notwithstanding these disadvantages, there is no military body that has been reduced to better subordination and discipline. Brought by the close boundaries of vessels not only under the continual observation of their own officers, but that of the officers of the ship, they are kept up to a degree of discipline which must, from a different state of things, be unknown in encampments and stations for soldiers on shore; and I believe I shall not appeal in vain to the present Commander-in-chief of the Army for evidence of their strict subordination, discipline, and respectful demeanor to all officers while under his command in Florida; and also to bear me out in the statement, that no portion of the encampment was more distinguished for its quiet, order, and police, than that occupied by the marines. An augmentation of this corps would at once place it on a different footing, and enable it to remedy those defects which have impaired its efficiency. It would be well worthy of consideration, whether this increase should not be extended so as to be sufficient not only for our vessels of war and naval stations, but also for the charge of the forts in the vicinity of those stations. Decided advantages on the score of convenience and

economy to the Government would attend this arrangement, while it would release a portion of the army for the more important requirements of the War Department. Our naval depots could be immediately strengthened in cases of emergency, by reinforcements drawn from these posts, which would likewise possess a reciprocal advantage by detachments from the naval depots, and the ships of war lying there. The contingent expenses of the marines would be materially diminished, and much of their time saved, which is now occupied in their being conveyed from post to post. Ships of war which may have returned to port for the purpose of supplying their complement, reduced from death, sickness, or the expiration of terms of service, would not be detained until the proper number should be transported from some distant station, and would thus enjoy facilities of an important character. The marines themselves would become more expert soldiers, and infinitely more useful on board ships of war, from the drilling they would be subjected to in the forts, as well as the practice they would acquire with the musket; and the good training they would receive in the use and fire of cannon would render them particularly efficient on board the steamers employed in harbor defence, which vessels, not requiring sails, could then dispense with seamen, and enable them to pursue their calling where they would be so much demanded—in ships of war and privateers on the ocean. In time of war, the advantage of employing the same description of force under one control in the naval depots, in the forts in their vicinity, and in the harbor steamers, could not be overrated; and on the occasion of any attack on any one point, they could act in a united body, and could also be readily reinforced by the naval officers, seamen, and volunteers of the commercial cities in the immediate neighborhood. For these purposes, an augmentation of the marine corps to a division of four or five thousand men, would be required in periods of active war. It would then become a distinct military arm—at all times, however, under the control of the Navy Department, and the navy of the United States. The officers would have a wider field whereon to display their character as soldiers, and higher grades to look up to for the excitement of their ambition. It would have a happy effect, too, on the navy, and enhance their anxiety for the security of the commercial cities near their naval depots, and again call forth similar energies as were displayed by them when Baltimore was threatened by attack in the late war; on which occasion, the appearance in the streets of a gallant body of seamen and marines under Commodore Rogers restored the drooping spirits of the citizens and authorities, and banished all idea of the proposition for a surrender, like that of Alexandria, for the purpose of saving the town from destruction. Their good conduct was proved in the subsequent results, as it has often been on other occasions. The defence of the cities of Portsmouth, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Pensacola, would thus be confided entirely to the marines and the navy, who would thereby enable that portion of the army they would replace to sustain the honor of the country on other fields. That they would prove themselves worthy of these high trusts, there can be no doubt. If there should be, I have only to call to my aid the high authority of Napoleon, that greatest of military commanders, and to use his well-known expression in regard to the marines of the Bellerophon: "What might not be done with a hundred thousand such men!"

As respects the laws for the better government of the navy, you have truly said, in your report, that their defects consist principally in their *looseness*, especially in the latitude given to courts-martial.

Although the punishments are stated in each article, yet the concluding license, "or such other punishment as a court shall inflict," would seem to justify a court in assuming the mitigating power, which the law confides to other authority: hence arises inequality of punishment, or the entire escape of offenders. At one court-martial, a trivial or no punishment may be adjudged to an officer who is, perhaps, worthless; while, at another court, a very meritorious officer may undergo the severest penalties of the law, for a similar offence, owing to the obligation this court may feel themselves under to sustain their own character as the guardians of their service, and meet the spirit of the regulations. A clear definition of the punishment to be inflicted in the most frequent cases, leaving the remission or mitigation of it to the power where it is lodged by law, or under the recommendation of the court, (which shall, if it deems such recommendation proper, embody its reasons for so doing,) will, I think, constitute the best remedy for this evil; and this can be effected by very slight alterations of the present code of laws. I will therefore observe, by way of example, that, in the first article, a commander is, at present, required to correct all such as are guilty of dissolute or immoral practices, "*according to the usages of the sea service.*" A manifest improvement on this vague and indefinite power for effecting the object of the article, would be the adoption of a specific one, such as "an admonition or reprimand from the commander," who would thereby be enabled at once to meet the objects of this article. It would do away, too, with the necessity of resorting, on many trifling occasions, to courts-martial, which renders them oppressive to the service and expensive to the country. On account of a desire to avoid such courts-martial, the service has suffered materially; for the occasions falling under the above article, and which are of the most frequent occurrence, have often been passed over and unnoticed, and an insubordination has, in consequence, grown up, which has contributed, in no small degree, to the destruction of our discipline. A similar abridgment of the discretionary power invested in courts martial should be extended to the other articles. For instance: in article 3d, the punishment of dismission from the navy should attach, and there should be no opportunity given for an offender to escape with a more trifling one, "or such other punishment as a court martial shall adjudge," when convicted of oppression, cruelty, fraud, theft, profane swearing, or drunkenness. In like manner, throughout the other articles, should a clear and specific penalty be attached to each offence. Then, the complaints now so universal against the favoritism and injustice of courts martial would cease. No inequality of punishment for the same offence, or escape of offenders, would ever occur; and officers, who would thus know their inevitable fate for violations of law, would be more cautious in their acts, and would be more stimulated to ambitious performance of duty.

While upon this subject, I will call your attention to one peculiarity in the laws governing the navy. They give to a commander of a squadron the right of approving and carrying into effect a sentence of death against a commissioned or warrant officer; and yet, while vesting him with this high power, they forbid his approval going to the *dismission* of such officers from the navy. A reversal of these powers would seem to me to be more in accordance with the dictates of sound reason; so that, while the commander of a squadron should have authority over a sentence of dismission, that of death should be reserved to the control of the Chief Magistrate. But, whatever may be said of the decisions of courts martial, the preservation of naval rights and of naval discipline emphatically demands that, when approved

by the proper authority, those decisions shall be final and conclusive. The laws have assigned a revisionary and scrutinizing jurisdiction over all the proceedings of courts-martial, with power to correct errors, and to mitigate or remit unwarrantable or cruel punishments. Ought the authorities to pervert a power which has been reserved to them for legitimate and proper purposes, in order to accommodate it to the softer emotions of the heart; to mould it to the purposes of "children and women's tears;" or to make it pliant to the persuasive influence of politicians; and thus *throw back into the service* the convicted members who had dishonored it, and render an important military establishment, in effect, a charitable institution? The stern protection by the British Government of all the rights of her navy, and her uniform discountenance of every effort to reinstate those who had compulsorily left the service, have contributed, in no small degree, to build up that proud arm of Britain's power. A different policy on the part of our Government will tarnish and degrade the character of a valuable corps; will fill it with heart-burnings, discontent, and jealousies; will teach with what impunity the rigid rules of military discipline can be violated, and will ultimately end in the ruin of all the naval expectations of the country.

The great difficulty of enlisting seamen in the navy, which has grown up more and more of late years, notwithstanding the encouragement given to them by good pay, &c., is to be attributed to various causes; one of the principal of which is, in my apprehension, to be found in the mode of enlisting them. Formerly, when a ship of war was to be employed, the officers were immediately appointed; some of whom, by the selection of the captain, opened two or three rendezvous, for the purpose of recruiting the number of men required. This was generally accomplished by the time the ship was prepared for sea, and often in a few days. This method of procuring seamen was, however, attended with some inconvenience to some commanders; for, limited as the service has been, it has not been without a portion of officers with whom seamen were unwilling to sail. Hence the change of the system. Permanent recruiting establishments have been made, and all men are shipped for general service. They are then *immured* in receiving vessels, which causes them to feel as though they were in floating prisons, where they remain unoccupied often for three, six, or nine months, until they are required for sea. The consequences of this system are, that the best seamen now avoid the naval service, when formerly they preferred it. It is often, also, made to subvert the personal convenience of improvident and destitute men, who resort to the rendezvous and ship into the service for the sole object of immediate relief, which is obtained in the advance of two months' wages which they then receive. Desertion, which was before of so unfrequent occurrence, is thus stimulated; or if there should be no opportunity for this, they seek for their discharge—occupying the time of the Secretary of the Navy by the intercessions of their families, or by what is often of more avail—the eloquence of political partisans; thus subjecting the country to a pecuniary loss, and increasing the expense of recruiting. By the present arrangement, too, much of the time of men is lost on board the receiving vessels; and ships leave port, having on board men whose times of service expire at different periods, a portion of whom are thus detained beyond the period for which they volunteered. A return to the former system would now, I think, be attended with advantage. It is but fair that our seamen should have the same rights as are extended to the privates in the army, who are permitted to enlist in the infantry, cavalry, or artillery, and in the regiment and company they prefer. Let them choose the officers with

whom they will *serve*, and the class of vessels, as well as the particular ones, in which they like to *sail*. What has been deemed the only inconvenience, will constitute, in my mind, an advantage; for it will disclose to the eye of the Government the oppressor or imbecile, and afford it a certain index whereby to judge of the rectitude of conduct and the discretion of those placed in command; and it would constitute an additional inducement for officers to command discreetly and lawfully.

The apprentice system, as established in the navy, cannot be relied upon for an ample supply of seamen, as the number of boys who are thus received into the service must be in proportion to the force employed. It will, I apprehend, not go much further than in supplying the petty and warrant officers of vessels of war. The coasting trade was much relied upon formerly as a nursery of seamen; but this source must necessarily be much impaired by the introduction of steam navigation on our inland waters for the transport of merchandise, and the towing of vessels, together with the communications by canals between different rivers. Under these circumstances, should there be no encouragement given to the increase of seamen by some other means in the power of the Government, we shall soon be left with but a small number of native seamen, and will be forced to lean upon time-serving foreigners, who, in the hour of danger, would abandon our service; or, if they remained, would not be entitled to our confidence. I would, therefore, most respectfully suggest that some inducement, by pecuniary aid, or otherwise, be extended to the merchants of the country, to adopt the apprenticing system on board of their vessels. The introduction of this system into the merchant service, under the regulation of wholesome laws, would undoubtedly create a very important nursery for American seamen, and I should presume much more could be accomplished in this way, and with less means, than by the system now practised; and were an avenue kept open in the navy, for the reception of some of the meritorious young men thus schooled, it would go far to induce lads to offer themselves as apprentices in the mercantile marine.

The rule pursued, prior to the establishment of the navy board, for the promotion of young officers, was to require the certificate of all the commanders with whom the candidate had sailed, of his capacity and fitness for such promotion. This dependence on the good opinion of the commanders with whom he served, obliged him to be alert, and to conduct himself properly on all occasions, in order to obtain the necessary certificate, which the commanders felt themselves bound, in honor to the service, not to give when undeserved. The salutary effect of this dependence of young officers on the good opinion of their commanders, through their good conduct and efficiency for promotion, has been verified in by-gone days. Under the present independent system, the young officer scarcely ever looks up to his commander for his approbation; and the commander as seldom takes any interest in the officer, and feels under little or no responsibility for him. The consequence of this state of things is, that merit remains unsought; and officers who can succeed as well without it as with it, are deprived of every spur to ambition and every motive to exertion. The younger officers are promoted indiscriminately, without regard to their character and qualifications; and in the same manner are they advanced in large batches from rank to rank, year by year, many of them standing in the way of the promotion of meritorious men, and becoming only fit subjects for a retired list. To suppose that every lad who enters the navy is capable of becoming proficient in his profession, competent to conduct your forces on the ocean, and sustain the high responsibilities of his position, would be the

same as supposing that every person who embarked in any other profession would also become capable of attaining its highest honors. A more regular and more frequent system of promotions, based upon a strict scrutiny into character and merit, advancing a few at a time, and the establishment of more grades, (which you have so judiciously urged,) would be productive of great advantage, by operating as a constant stimulant to effort on the part of candidates, and inspiring them with hopes which would break down that despondency so apt to be occasioned by slow advancement in time of peace. I would here enjoin on the Government the necessity of not sparing the *pruning knife*, so essential to the production of good fruit—particularly if used in the lawful way, through courts-martial. There is no navy, however limited, that would not, without this aid, have in its ranks some members by whose expulsion it would be improved; but I may, at the same time, safely say that the proportion of aspiring officers in the navy of the United States *cannot be surpassed*, if equalled, by that of any other power.

The passed midshipman is now required to perform important duties, which were formerly under the control and direction of a very useful class of officers called masters and masters' mates; the consequence of which is, that the navy is closed against that body of expert and consummate seamen who are engaged in the conduct of our commercial marine. This was an impolitic and unjust excision, and was not warranted by our historical reminiscences, which are replete with names for which we are indebted to that service, who have borne the flag of the country gloriously through all its trials on the ocean.

I cannot find language strong enough to express my conviction of the urgent necessity for additional instruction being imparted to the young officers, though I cannot concur in the opinion so often urged in favor of the establishment of an institution similar to that of West Point. The *best school* for teaching the young officer his profession is the ship itself, kept in active employment; but the Government owes it to its own interests, honor, and the cause of justice, that the means should no longer be withheld from him of acquiring a suitable knowledge of mathematics, a thorough acquaintance with the *laws of nations* and the languages of different countries; and, in view of the introduction of steam as a mode of propelling vessels, it will be also highly important that he should be made fully conversant with the principles of that power, and the machinery through which it acts. By the instruction of passed midshipmen in even *one* additional modern language, a ship of war could be at any time furnished with proficient in almost all the different tongues that might be met with on her cruise. In time of war, the benefits that would be derived from a full knowledge of these subjects would be incalculable. While it would enable us to exercise our belligerent rights with propriety and safety, it would also put it in our power to understand the various papers of neutrals, preventing deceptions, or saving them from vexatious detentions and seizures, and the country and officers from damages and complaints. I cannot better illustrate the consequences that resulted from an ignorance of an important language, than by stating a circumstance that came under my own notice during our last war with Great Britain. While cruising in the *Constitution*, disguised as an English frigate, and under English colors, we fell in with a large merchant ship, which displayed the Russian flag. An officer in the English uniform was sent on board, who was politely received, and, to his surprise, addressed by name. The papers could not be deciphered; the log-book was equally unintelligible; and the ship being under the flag of our good friend

the Emperor of Russia, it was supposed that all was right, and she was permitted to go on her way. In the sequel, it was boasted that this was an English vessel, under assimilated Russian papers, with a highly valuable cargo, and that her officers had been selected on account of their having been in the United States, where they had obtained drawings of the appearance of our ships, a personal acquaintance with many of our officers, and a variety of information, which might aid them in screening their vessels from capture. How many other examples of this kind did or might occur, the ease with which this deception was practised may afford some idea.

The practice, heretofore, in our service, of filling up the different grades with more officers than are requisite for duty, and the creating *civil shore* stations for their employment, has ever seemed to me impolitic, and attended with injury to the officers themselves. Service on shore differs, in many respects, from service at sea. The employment is light, and to a great extent apparent. The pride of command, the sensitiveness of rank, and the high bearing so essential to a gallant officer, must necessarily become impaired, and yield to the injurious consequences resulting from habits of inertness and inactivity, and the train of evils which accompany them. The gun boat employment, in former days, was not more destructive to chivalry, morals, and discipline. It is only an active and a devoted career, on his own element, that can constitute the accomplished seaman and skillful commander. This is the only path for the acquirement of distinction, honor, and success, when the country calls upon him to meet the foe on the ocean. I would, therefore, recommend a re-organization of the navy-yards, and the suppression of shore stations as much as possible. Let the navy-yards be reserved for the veterans—those who have served their country meritoriously for a long period of years. The worn-out captains, sailing-masters, boatswains, and sailmakers, would here find useful employment, and with it a resting place in the decline of life. At the same time, the commandant of the yard should be freed from the high and inappropriate responsibilities the present system enjoins, and should be only charged with the general police and security of the yard, and with the equipment and supply of vessels of war, under the direction of the proper bureau; thus securing responsibility, economy, and harmony in each department of business.

But not only are too many officers employed on shore, but they are also *crowded on board of our vessels of war*, on account of which their duties are so subdivided as to leave but little to be performed by each; their situations are rendered *irksome*, their apartments uncomfortable, and many causes of jealousies, disagreements, and insubordination arise, which have gone far to impair their discipline and *esprit du corps*. In the views which I have at different times set forth on naval subjects, it has been a main point with me, not only to restrict officers, as much as possible, from civil service, but also to keep their numbers within the wants of our navy in peace. And in these views I have been actuated by considerations of permanent advantage to the officers themselves, and to the service in general; for it is at all times good policy to keep in mind, that in our country a naval establishment can be as readily destroyed by the hand of profusion as by that of penury. By prescribing a limit to it by law, the Executive department would be relieved from the pressure of applicants, the corps would be rendered more select, and the promotions less irregular and more satisfactory in regard to competency and talent. According to the last Navy Register, the vessels now in a condition to be officered would require the following complement:

Names of vessels.	Number of guns.	Number of decks.	Captains.	Commanders.	Lieutenants.	Midshipmen.
Pennsylvania, - - -	120	4	1	-	12	30
Columbus, - - -	74	3	1	-	9	24
Ohio, - - -	74	3	1	-	9	24
North Carolina, - -	74	3	1	-	9	24
Delaware, - - -	74	3	1	-	9	24
Independence, - - -	54	2	1	-	6	18
United States, - - -	44	1	1	-	4	16
Constitution, - - -	44	1	1	-	4	16
Java, - - -	44	1	1	-	4	16
Potomac, - - -	44	1	1	-	4	16
Brandywine, - - -	44	1	1	-	4	16
Columbia, - - -	44	1	1	-	4	16
Congress, - - -	44	1	1	-	4	16
Constellation, - - -	36	1	1	-	4	14
Macedonian, - - -	36	1	1	-	4	14
Steamer Mississippi, -	10	1	1	-	4	14
Steamer Missouri, - -	10	1	1	-	4	14
Steamer Fulton, - - -	4	1	1	-	3	12
18 sloops of war, from 16 to 20 guns, requiring, - - -	-	-	-	18	54	180
10 brigs and schooners, - - -	-	-	-	-	30	40
Total number of officers required,	18	18	185	544		

Thus, were war to occur immediately, and all the vessels now in condition for service to be officered and sent to sea, 18 captains, 18 commanders, 185 lieutenants, and 544 midshipmen, could only be employed on board to advantage. But, to the actual floating service, let an additional number be allowed for disability from age, sickness, or other causes, and for the supply of all proper stations on shore. The captains' list should be increased by the same number; the commanders' by three-fourths, and the lieutenants' list by one half. We shall then have, in a state of peace, 36 captains, 32 commanders, 277 lieutenants, and 544 midshipmen—officers sufficient for the whole service; as at no time, unless in war, would all the above vessels be employed. No additional allowance should be made to the midshipmen's list, in order that this grade of officers should be kept constantly on duty at sea; or, in port, in the line of that profession they require to be taught. Vacancies occurring in their list could be filled from the numerous applicants for those appointments.

In addition to the foregoing numbers, there would be required, if all our ships repairing, rotten, or on the stocks, were in a condition to proceed to sea, the following:

	Captains.	Commanders.	Lieutenants.	Midshipmen.
For 6 additional ships-of-the-line, -	6	-	54	144
For 7 additional frigates, - - -	7	-	28	112
Total, - - -	13	-	82	256
Add for casualties, &c., - - -	13	-	41	
Total required, - - -	26	-	123	256
To this add the number as before stated, - - -	36	32	277	544
	62	32	400	800

This number, therefore, of 62 captains, 32 commanders, 400 lieutenants, and 800 midshipmen, would be amply sufficient for every post which ought to be assigned to naval officers—supposing that we were in a state of war, and every vessel equipped that we have provided. Whatever additional vessels would be required on the lakes, could be officered by making the proper number of promotions, and filling up their vacancies in the midshipmen's list.

Formerly, I could not but feel some delicacy in referring to the subject of higher rank in the navy; but now I feel that I may do so, with more propriety, because my years admonish me that the time for studying its duties, in order to be enabled to meet its responsibilities, has passed away, and has left me, so far as I am personally concerned, indifferent to the rank. The establishment of the grade of admirals, at the close of the last war, would have been highly gratifying to those officers who had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves; and although its mantle might not, at that time, have rested on any of their shoulders, their proudest satisfaction would have been, that the assent of the nation had been acquired to this rank as a reward for their meritorious services, and that a new stimulant, other than a pecuniary compensation, had been offered for future efforts. Then, it would have invigorated the service, and held out a pinnacle for young ambition to climb to; it would have contributed materially to the discipline and subordination of the navy, and thus prepared it for any future contests with that of any other nation which might be arrayed as an enemy of the country.

At the time that the narrow limits of a peace establishment were assigned to the navy, the necessity for higher rank, with a view to actual service in fleets or squadrons, was not very great; but a just policy would not have diminished the utility of it, even on that account; for, then, the service contained several gallant men who had contributed, by their skill, valor, and patriotism, to establish the independence of our country. Early in the revolutionary war they were appointed captains—that rank they still retained in wars of more recent date; and in later years, when the scenes of life were about to close around them, they were still found to be "Captains in the navy." If we seek in the national legislature for the grounds of this policy in regard to higher rank, we find ourselves at fault; nor can we divine a single sound reason for it. Is this higher rank inexpedient with us, because our navy is more limited in force and numbers than the navies of the great powers of Europe? This very fact, it seems to me, is a reason for the adoption of a contrary policy; for, then, the rank and value of its appointments would compensate for the deficiency of respect it naturally commands through its inferiority. Occasions might occur (as they have already occurred) when a co-operation with a foreign force, employed for the same object, would be desirable. This could not take place, in consequence of the lowness of the grade or rank of the American commander; and thus the inequality of rank in the commanding officers, forbidding an equality of effort, opinion, and responsibility, there would be lost to the country opportunities of effecting valuable results through a combination of force with friendly powers. Occasions such as these have already arisen in the limited history of our service.

In the war with Tripoli, an inadequate naval force was sent to chastise that regency for their insults and aggressions. At the same time, a similar force under an admiral was employed by Sweden against the same state, and with the same object. These forces, acting separately, neither could nor did they effect anything; but, united, they could have obtained every result desired, and in a short time have

encountered heavy additional expenses for continued and increased forces—after the loss of one of their finest frigates—after the incarceration, for many months, in dungeons, of the officers and crew of that frigate, and a considerable expenditure for their final ransom—and after the loss of several gallant men.

However little importance "*we*" may attach to the subject of precedence or equality in honors and salutes with foreign nations, we should not forget that even the most inconsiderable maritime powers abroad consider it of too much consequence to be dictated their own terms to the common enemy. In consequence of the disparity of the rank of the commanding officers, a union of their two forces was not practicable; and the feelings of an American captain, and a sense of the national honor, would not admit of his placing himself, voluntarily, in a subordinate situation to others. After a short period the Swedish forces retired from the contest, having made peace by tribute. The United States continued the war a few years longer; nor did they retire under a treaty of peace, until after they had overlooked. Our intercourse and exchange of hospitality with them are marred, for our commanders are nowhere received on that equality which does not involve a diminution of respect for our country and the honor of our flag. Our officers have feelings of their own on this subject, it is true; but they have also feelings for their country. A disposition has been evinced by one or two nations to place our captains commanding squadrons on a footing with the lowest grade of their flag-officers. But no American commander could so far forget himself as to receive as a boon, from other nations, that which was *denied* him by the policy of his own.

Whether this rank be accorded to the navy or not, I would *unhesitatingly recommend your suppression of the system of broad pendants*. Formerly, this was the emblem displayed to designate the locality of the senior officer afloat; but now, the naval regulations have perverted this simple object to the gratification of personal vanity, and, not unfrequently, three flags may be seen flying side by side, where no more force floats than the three ships of war from which they fly. Where they are in use, they must sometimes lead to the interruption of harmony in the fleet or squadron; and instances have not been wanting where the flying of two pendants of different colors has led to collisions between the officers, and also the seamen.

In thus presenting to you, sir, these observations on our naval service, I have felt that the subject is one of a very fruitful character, and I have confined myself to what seems to me to comprise its most serious defects, feeling that I should trespass too much upon your time and patience by entering more minutely into all its ramifications. I will therefore conclude by observing, that the best system and the best remedies would be of no avail, unless directed by skill, *vigor*, and efficiency. That these qualities will be found in your administration of this department, the favorable auspices under which it has been commenced afford the surest guarantee to the navy and country; and on some future occasion, when, perhaps, by victories and triumphs upon the ocean, a halo of glory may encircle this right arm of our defence, to your administration may be referred the commencement of an era which *restored* the lost energies of the service, and rendered the navy again the pride of the republic.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. STEWART.

To the Hon. A. P. UPSHUR,

Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

PAPERS ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF THE NAVAL COMMITTEE, in the last No.

A.
Annual expenditures for the naval service of the United States, from 1821 to 1843 inclusive.

Years.	Amounts.	Years.	Amounts.
1821	\$3,319,243 68	1833.....	\$4,274,184 26
1822	2,224,458 98	1834.....	4,613,656 45
1823	2,503,765 83	1835.....	4,209,835 94
1824	2,904,581 56	1836.....	6,252,145 24
1825	3,049,083 86	1837.....	7,891,364 32
1826	4,218,902 45	1838.....	6,839,867 22
1827	4,263,877 45	1839.....	6,787,562 37
1828	3,918,786 44	1840.....	6,113,896 89
1829	3,988,642 47	1841.....	6,001,076 97
1830	3,239,428 63	1842.....	8,397,242 95
1831	3,856,183 07	1843 (1st 6 mo.)	3,672,717 79
1832	4,947,718 00		

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Register's Office, February 8, 1844.

SIR: The following statement is transmitted, in compliance with your request of the 7th inst., viz.:
Warrants drawn on account of the navy, after deducting the repayments.

In 1840.....\$6,113,896 89 }
1841.....6,001,076 97 } Being the actual
1842.....8,397,242 95 } expenditure.
1843 (1st 6 mo.) 3,672,717 79 }

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. L. SMITH.

HON. WILLIAM PARMENTER,
House of Representatives.

B.
Statement showing the number of captains and masters commandant (or commanders) in the United States navy, in service on the 1st of January of each year, from 1814 to 1844, inclusively.

Years.	Captains.	Masters commandant, or commanders.	Years.	Captains.	Masters commandant, or commanders.
1814.....	22	18	1830.....	37	34
1815, Aug. 1.	32	18	1831.....	37	33
1816.....	—	—	1832.....	40	37
1817.....	31	22	1833.....	37	41
1818.....	34	25	1834.....	37	41
1819.....	35	23	1835.....	37	40
1820.....	34	22	1836.....	38	40
1821.....	32	32	1837.....	40	41
1822.....	31	31	1838.....	50	49
1823.....	30	30	1839.....	52	55
1824.....	28	30	1840.....	55	55
1825.....	24	29	1841.....	55	55
1826.....	32	27	1842.....	68	96
1827.....	31	29	1843.....	67	94
1828.....	33	29	1844.....	67	96
1829.....	35	33			

* No register printed.

C.
Statement showing the number of officers of the navy of the different grades, and the number of petty officers and seamen, in service, each year, since 1820.

Years.	Captains.	Commanders.	Lieutenants.	Surgeons.	Assistant surgeons.	Pursers.	Chaplains.	Passed midshipmen and midshipmen.	Masters.	Masters' mates.	Boatswains.	Gunners.	Carpenters.	Sailmakers.	Professors of mathematics.
1820	34	22	202	47	34	44	12	350	76	4	19	22	17	12	—
1821	32	32	193	47	46	44	13	366	62	2	14	18	12	8	—
1822	31	31	196	46	41	42	10	348	58	1	16	17	13	10	—
1823	30	30	183	42	32	40	9	325	53	1	16	18	13	11	—
1824	28	30	172	35	38	39	8	383	51	—	15	18	14	12	—
1825	24	29	228	34	40	40	10	356	48	—	16	16	10	10	—
1826	32	27	209	39	35	42	10	381	43	—	13	12	10	9	—
1827	31	29	228	40	40	43	9	374	36	—	15	14	11	9	—
1828	33	29	229	37	37	42	9	392	33	—	14	18	14	11	—
1829	35	33	257	43	54	41	9	445	30	—	17	19	13	14	—
1830	37	34	258	39	58	43	9	476	32	—	18	20	16	16	—
1831	37	33	255	37	46	43	9	431	31	—	18	19	13	17	—
1832	40	37	259	44	38	42	9	419	32	—	21	16	12	18	—
1833	37	41	259	44	45	43	9	450	31	—	16	19	15	13	—
1834	37	41	250	43	46	43	8	450	29	—	18	17	16	14	—
1835	37	40	257	44	46	43	9	450	27	—	18	20	20	19	4
1836	38	40	257	43	50	42	9	450	27	—	21	20	20	19	8
1837	40	41	258	44	49	44	9	450	27	—	22	25	20	19	11
1838	50	49	276	49	57	45	9	428	27	—	25	29	25	24	13
1839	52	55	285	60	67	49	11	445	27	—	32	35	27	26	16
1840	55	55	290	61	70	51	13	422	29	—	32	37	24	25	17
1841	55	55	288	59	74	53	13	457	28	—	29	36	28	27	17
1842	68	96	328	69	66	64	24	563	30	4	32	41	36	33	25
1843	67	91	324	69	69	64	22	543	31	7	37	40	38	35	26

E.

A table showing the number of persons for the war complements of the different classes of vessels of the navy of the United States.

RANK OR RATINGS.	SHIPS OF THE LINE.				FRIGATES.		SLOOPS.		Brigs or schooners.	Monthly pay.
	Three decks.	Two decks.		Razee.	1st class.	2d class.	1st class.	2d class.		
		1st class.	2d class.							
Captain.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	As established by law.
Commander *.....	1	1	1	-	-	-	or 1	1	-	
Lieutenant commanding.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Lieutenants.....	11	8	8	7	6	5	4	4	2	
Master.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Surgeon.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Purser.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Chaplain.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	
Second master.....	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Assistant surgeons.....	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	
Passed midshipmen.....	36	27	24	21	20	16	10	8	5	
Master's mate, being warrant officers, and midshipmen.....										
Boatswain.....										
Gunner.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Carpenter.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Sailmaker.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Professor of mathematics.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Clerk.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Master's mate, not being war- rant officers.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Yeoman †.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Boatswain's mates.....	6	6	6	5	4	3	2	2	2	
Gunner's mates.....	6	4	4	3	2	2	1	1	1	
Carpenter's mates.....	4	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	
Master-at-arms.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Ship's cook.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Quartermasters.....	12	10	10	9	7	6	4	4	3	
Quartergunners.....	24	18	18	14	10	8	4	4	3	
Captains of forecastle.....	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	
Captains of tops.....	9	9	9	8	6	6	4	4	-	
Coxswain.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Armorer.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	
Cooper.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	
Ship's steward.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Officer's stewards.....	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	
Surgeon's steward.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Sailmaker's mates.....	2	2	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	
Captains of hold.....	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	-	
Officer's cooks.....	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	
Ship corporals.....	3	2	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	
Master of the bands.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	
Seamen.....	300	240	220	200	150	120	55	50	17	
Ordinary seamen.....	350	250	180	150	100	70	38	33	12	
Musicians, 1st class.....	8	6	6	6	4	3	-	-	-	
Musicians, 2d class.....	6	5	5	4	3	2	-	-	-	
Landsmen.....	250	150	130	110	60	45	20	14	7	
Boys.....	78	56	49	37	24	20	12	10	6	
Total (excepting marines)...	1,140	830	710	610	430	340	179	159	70	
MARINES.										
Captain or superior officer.....	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	As established by law.
Lieutenants.....	2	2	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	
Sergeants.....	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	-	
Corporals.....	4	4	4	3	3	3	2	2	-	
Drummer.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Fifer.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	
Privates.....	48	48	48	31	31	21	10	10	-	
Total of marines.....	60	60	60	40	40	30	16	16	-	
Total war complements.....	1,200	890	770	650	470	370	195	175	70	

* If no commander is placed in a ship-of-the-line, then one additional lieutenant.

† Pay in ships-of-the-line, \$40 per month; in frigates, \$35 per month; sloops of war, \$25 per month; schooners, \$18 per month.

The foregoing table shows the full complement of officers, petty officers, seamen, ordinary seamen, landsmen, boys, and marines, which may be allowed to vessels of the navy. The whole number of petty officers and persons of inferior ratings is not to be increased in any case, nor must the number in any particular rating be exceeded, unless it be to make up an existing deficiency in some higher rating, except by special order of the Secretary of the Navy.

When the commander of a squadron is also the commander of a particular vessel, he is to be borne as part of her complement; but if he does not command a particular vessel, then he is to be borne in addition to the complement of the vessel in which he is embarked.

The following persons may also be borne in addition to the complement of vessels in which the commander of a squadron is borne, viz.: a captain of a fleet, when authorized by the regulations of the navy; a flag lieutenant, a secretary, a clerk, and a coxswain; and, when he does not command the vessel, a steward, a cook, and three domestics. With a commander of a squadron, when not commanding-in-chief, a flag lieutenant, a secretary, and a coxswain; and, when he does not command the vessel, a steward, a cook, and two domestics. When a captain of a fleet is borne, then one steward and two domestics, in addition to those of the commander of the squadron.

NAVY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE,
December 9, 1837.

I. CHAUNCEY,

President of the Board of Navy Commissioners.

The Hon. MAHLON DICKERSON,

Secretary of the Navy.

Respectfully submitted to the President of the United States, January 20, 1838.

MAHLON DICKERSON,

Secretary of the Navy.

Approved, January 20, 1838. M. VAN BUREN.

D.

Statement showing the number of vessels in the United States navy, and the aggregate number of guns rated, on the 1st January of each year, from 1817 to 1844, inclusively.

Years.	Number of vessels.	Number of guns rated.	Years.	Number of vessels.	Number of guns rated.
1817*	66	1,215	1831.....	39	1,267
1818*	64	1,275	1832.....	40	1,291
1819*	58	1,233	1833†.....	53	1,981
1820*	58	1,373	1834†.....	53	1,981
1821.....	30	1,013	1835†.....	52	1,969
1822.....	32	1,043	1836†.....	52	1,969
1823.....	32	1,075	1837†.....	55	1,982
1824.....	39	1,119	1838.....	55	1,982
1825.....	34	1,104	1839.....	58	2,022
1826.....	32	1,106	1840.....	68	2,106
1827.....	34	1,163	1841.....	67	2,106
1828.....	37	1,243	1842§.....	70	2,044
1829.....	41	1,315	1843.....	68	2,022
1830.....	40	1,285	1844.....	78	2,124

*Including vessels on the lakes.

†Including those on the stocks.

‡Rates altered.

§Rates again altered.

G.

Number of forward officers in the service Jan. 1, 1842.

Boatswains,	-	-	-	-	30
Gunners,	-	-	-	-	42
Carpenters,	-	-	-	-	36
Sailmakers,	-	-	-	-	32

Number now in service.

Boatswains,	-	-	-	-	32
Gunners,	-	-	-	-	39
Carpenters,	-	-	-	-	35
Sailmakers,	-	-	-	-	32

Masters, January 1, 1842,	-	-	-	31
Masters at present,	-	-	-	30

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 26, 1844.

I.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 9, 1844.

SIR: In compliance with your request of the 30th ultimo, made in behalf of the honorable Committee on Naval Affairs, I have the honor to enclose, herewith, a statement of the number of petty officers, ordinary seamen, landsmen, boys, and apprentices in the navy, for each year, from 1826 to 1844, inclusive, so far as the number could be estimated at the commencement of the present year, which is 8,505. It may be proper to state, however, that the number of petty officers, seamen, &c., will approximate to about 10,000, which is 321 less than the number in service in 1843; but, as the number is constantly fluctuating, by the expiration of the service of crews, and new enlistments, it will be more accurately represented by the number of 10,000.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID HENSHAW.

Hon. WILLIAM PARMENTER,

Of the Committee on Naval Affairs, H. R.

A statement of the number of petty officers, ordinary seamen, landsmen, boys, and apprentices in the navy, for each year, from 1826 to 1844, inclusive.

Commencement of 1826	-	-	-	3,778
Do. 1827	-	-	-	3,780
Do. 1828	-	-	-	4,419
Do. 1829	-	-	-	4,339
Do. 1830	-	-	-	4,661
Do. 1831	-	-	-	4,450
Do. 1832	-	-	-	2,941
Do. 1833	-	-	-	3,433
Do. 1834	-	-	-	3,822
Do. 1835	-	-	-	3,627
Do. 1836	-	-	-	3,804
Do. 1837	-	-	-	5,201
Do. 1838	-	-	-	5,051
Do. 1839	-	-	-	6,732
Do. 1840	-	-	-	7,072
Do. 1841	-	-	-	7,419
Do. 1842	-	-	-	9,784
Do. 1843	-	-	-	10,321
Do. 1844	-	-	-	8,505

K.

General estimate of the annual cost (including all expenses excepting wear and tear,) of supporting in commission one of each of the following description of vessels.

74-gun ship,	-	-	-	\$244,399
Frigate, 1st class,	-	-	-	141,632
Frigate, 2d class,	-	-	-	116,546
Sloop, 1st class,	-	-	-	66,993
Sloop, 2d class,	-	-	-	60,833
Sloop, 3d class,	-	-	-	50,722
Brig,	-	-	-	26,799
Schooner,	-	-	-	26,799
Steamer, size of the Mississippi,	-	-	-	97,317
Steamer, size of the Princeton,	-	-	-	56,300

H.

Statement showing the number of commissioned and warrant officers employed at the several navy-yards, and the aggregate expense of each navy-yard, from the year 1825 to 1843, inclusive, prepared from the estimates.

Years.	Portsmouth, N. H.			Boston.			New York.			Philadelphia.			Washington.			Norfolk.			Pensacola.			Total.		
	Commissioned.	Warrant.	Aggregate expense of yard.	Commissioned.	Warrant.	Aggregate expense of yard.	Commissioned.	Warrant.	Aggregate expense of yard.	Commissioned.	Warrant.	Aggregate expense of yard.	Commissioned.	Warrant.	Aggregate expense of yard.	Commissioned.	Warrant.	Aggregate expense of yard.	Commissioned.	Warrant.	Aggregate expense of yard.	Commissioned.	Warrant.	Aggregate expense of yard.
1825	4	3	\$23,251 25	10	7	\$33,804 50	10	7	\$38,238 00	6	3	\$26,200 25	8	5	\$43,035 98	10	7	\$39,735 25	1	1	-	48	32	\$209,265 23
1826	5	5	20,018 75	8	10	33,424 75	10	9	37,352 25	7	3	26,370 25	8	5	35,671 25	10	9	37,832 25	46	41	-	46	41	215,890 00
1827	5	5	20,018 75	10	9	37,324 75	10	9	37,352 25	7	3	26,370 25	8	5	35,671 25	10	9	37,832 25	56	43	\$25,226 50	56	43	219,796 00
1828	5	5	20,378 75	11	10	39,430 00	11	11	41,491 75	7	3	26,891 75	7	5	33,820 75	11	10	41,671 75	63	51	\$24,832 75	63	51	228,517 50
1829	6	6	23,091 75	11	10	40,349 50	11	12	43,712 25	9	5	30,241 00	9	5	37,445 50	11	11	46,238 25	68	56	\$28,796 75	68	56	249,875 00
1830	7	6	22,091 75	14	17	47,994 50	14	19	50,628 75	10	5	30,241 00	9	6	36,063 00	12	18	50,899 75	75	78	\$27,296 75	75	78	265,215 50
1831	7	6	22,091 75	14	17	47,446 00	14	19	50,080 25	10	5	30,241 00	9	6	36,063 00	14	18	50,350 25	77	78	\$27,296 75	77	78	264,669 00
1832	7	8	24,046 00	14	18	49,131 25	14	19	50,691 75	10	5	29,921 25	9	6	36,063 00	14	18	50,961 75	78	81	\$28,119 25	78	81	268,934 25
1833	6	8	23,225 25	13	22	51,048 50	13	22	53,224 50	8	6	30,439 75	8	6	33,395 50	13	22	54,151 00	93	92	\$28,466 25	93	92	273,950 75
1834	6	8	22,825 25	13	22	51,208 50	13	22	53,503 50	7	5	30,105 25	7	5	32,088 75	13	22	54,055 25	10	9	\$28,466 25	10	9	272,252 75
1835	6	8	23,618 25	13	22	52,996 50	13	22	55,291 50	10	4	31,358 50	7	6	31,609 00	14	22	56,146 50	10	9	\$29,810 00	73	93	280,830 25
1836	6	8	23,739 75	14	22	53,537 75	14	22	53,537 75	10	4	29,437 75	7	5	29,783 75	14	22	53,687 75	10	9	\$29,489 75	75	92	273,214 25
1837	6	8	23,739 75	14	22	53,537 75	14	22	53,537 75	11	4	30,937 75	7	5	30,363 75	15	22	55,187 75	10	9	\$30,939 75	77	92	278,244 25
1838	6	8	23,739 75	14	22	53,537 75	14	22	53,537 75	11	4	31,237 75	7	5	30,363 75	15	22	55,187 75	10	9	\$30,939 75	77	92	278,944 25
1839	6	8	24,489 75	14	22	53,687 75	14	22	53,687 75	11	5	35,137 75	7	5	30,363 75	15	22	55,187 75	10	9	\$30,939 75	77	93	283,494 45
1840	6	8	25,539 75	14	22	53,687 75	14	22	53,687 75	11	5	35,137 75	7	5	30,363 75	15	22	55,187 75	10	9	\$30,939 75	77	93	284,544 45
1841	6	8	25,539 75	14	22	53,687 75	14	22	53,687 75	11	5	35,137 75	7	5	30,363 75	15	22	55,187 75	10	9	\$30,939 75	77	93	284,544 45
1842	6	8	25,933 75	14	22	53,837 75	14	22	53,837 75	11	5	35,387 75	7	5	32,663 75	15	22	55,337 75	10	9	\$30,939 75	77	93	287,938 25
1843	6	11	30,042 00	15	21	58,496 00	15	21	58,496 00	13	9	41,796 00	9	9	35,216 00	16	21	60,296 00	13	12	\$44,598 00	87	104	328,940 00

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 13, 1844.

TRIBUTE OF RESPECT.

At a meeting of the officers of the Army at Fort Monroe, Va., on the 28th March, convened to adopt such measures as might be deemed appropriate, consequent to the decease, on the 26th instant, of their late brother officer, Surgeon Edward Macomb, of the Medical Department, Colonel J. B. Walbach being called to the chair, and 1st Lieut. and Adjutant Miller appointed secretary, it was unanimously *Resolved*,

1st. That the chairman appoint a committee of five officers to prepare resolutions expressive of the sense and feelings of this meeting. Whereupon Lieut. Col. De Russy, Major Belton, Brevet Major Brown, Capt. Huger, and Asst. Surgeon Wells were constituted a committee.

2d. *Resolved*, unanimously, that we sincerely regret the loss the service has sustained by the death of our comrade, Surgeon EDWARD MACOMB, late of the U. S. Army, who has been removed from amongst us in the midst of a life of usefulness: endeared to his friends by his amiability, cheerfulness, and agreeable social qualities, beloved by his relations for his affection and kindness, and respected by all for his character, talents, and virtue.

The country has lost a faithful and efficient officer, and the Medical Department of the Army, a distinguished member.

We sincerely sympathize with his afflicted widow for her irreparable loss. As a mark of respect for his memory, it is *Resolved*, That we wear the usual badge of mourning for thirty days.

3d. *Resolved*, unanimously, that the chairman present to Mrs. Macomb a copy of these resolutions, signed by each officer on the station.

4th. *Resolved*, that these resolutions be published in the following newspapers, to wit: Albany Journal, National Intelligencer, Army and Navy Chronicle, and Norfolk Herald.

The meeting then adjourned.

J. B. WALBACH,
Col. 4th Artillery, Chairman.

J. H. MILLER,
Adjt. 4th Artillery, Secretary.

Extract of a letter from an officer of the U. S. frigate *Congress*, to a friend in Washington, dated

"RIO DE JANEIRO, January 29, 1844.

"We arrived here yesterday, in 29 sailing days from Gibraltar, and found here the *Columbus* 74, frigate *Columbia*, and brig *Perry*, lying at anchor. The *Columbia* will sail in a few days for our old station the Mediterranean. The *Perry* is at present without a commander; Capt. Du Pont, who brought her out, has been condemned by medical survey, and will return home. Lieutenant TILTON has been ordered to command the *Perry*, and his brother, who was clerk to Capt. Voorhees, goes out as acting Purser. She is now waiting the arrival of the store ship; no stores are to be had here at present. The *Columbus* arrived from Montevideo only three days before us. As soon as provisions arrive, we shall sail for Montevideo, and probably remain there several months.

"The Cumberland did not accompany us out of the bay of Gibraltar; consequently we did not have the trial with her that we anticipated. Our passage across was very delightful; a fine breeze nearly all the way, though we had calms north of the line. We crossed with an eight knot breeze, and without the customary visit from father Neptune. We touched at Madeira, where we met the *Boston*; she sailed with us, but we had to keep our mizen topsail aback for her. We stopped three days at Santa Cruz, Teneriffe.

"Passed midshipman Gantt, our late master, is now acting lieutenant; and passed midshipman James L. Blair, from the brig *Perry*, has been appointed acting master in his stead. Midshipman John E. Prentiss, of the *Columbia*, died a few days ago, by bursting a blood vessel."

A letter dated February 3, says that the *Columbia* sailed on the 1st for the Mediterranean.

Extract of a letter from Cuba to an officer of the army, dated February 26, 1844.

"The whole country has been in a state of consternation, and but for the extreme precaution on the part of the government, a general revolt would, no doubt, have taken place.

"There is said to have been a conspiracy of mulattos; and many whites also have been imprisoned on suspicion. Five negroes belonging these estates have been seized, to-day, on a neighboring ingenio where they were working. The prisons are crowded (as it is said) with people of all colors. Several sugar estates have been set on fire but extinguished again, and bands of soldiers stationed to prevent further aggression.

"Besides the conspiracy of mulattos that is talked of, it is rumored that British agents have promised double the worth of their present property to several owners of estates, in case a revolution should take place. Several of these owners have been arrested on suspicion. With these two conspiracies in agitation, the captain general is compelled to take decided means."

THE GRAVE OF THOMPSON.

By J. McL. M.

Tread lightly o'er this hallowed ground,
For here the drooping willow sighs,
And morning's tears bedew the mound
Where the hero Thompson lies.

Within this cold and earthen cell,
That gallant warrior sleeps;
Mar not his quiet spell,
For angels round their vigils keep.

The bugle's note no longer will
His dreams of glory break,
That heart in death is still,
And now of higher joys partake.

Go ask—for glorious deeds—the true,
With whom he fought and bled.
Go ask!—they'll not construe
The acts of mighty dead.

He heard no "clash of arms,"
Th' unerring bullet pierced his breast—
'Mid savage yells, and wild alarms
His spirit sought, afar, its rest.

Sleep on—thy duty thou hast done:
Farewell—thou "bravest of the brave!"
Thy battle's fought, thy victory's won:
A country's tears, will moist thy grave.

U. S. Ship *Fairfield*,
MAHON, Nov. 16, 1843.

OFFICIAL.

U. S. SHIP MACEDONIAN.

CAPE PALMAS, *West Africa*,
December 21, 1843.

SIR : I have the honor to transmit herewith various papers numbered from 1 to 5 inclusive, giving detailed accounts of the proceedings of the Squadron under my command, in relation to the arrangement of the difficulties which have so long existed with many of the native tribes inhabiting that part of the coast of Africa, lying between Cape Mesurado and Cape Lahou.

From the delay in punishing the people of Little Berriby, for the murder of Captain Farewell and his crew, and the entire destruction of his vessel, they had been led to believe that the occurrence would be passed over without further notice, and this had emboldened them to greater insolence. Hence punishment came upon them when least expected.

In regard to the amount of punishment visited upon these people, there is but one opinion on board ship and on shore, that it was far short of what they deserved; but my instructions enjoined measures of reasonable lenity, and I was myself disposed to such course. The shedding of blood in the affair was unpremeditated and accidental. The natives commenced the fire, and it is fortunate that no more of them fell.

In the melee King Ben Cracow, and his Interpreter were killed, and this would seem a providential result, as both these persons unquestionably took an active part in the massacre of Captain Farewell and his crew.

The known fierceness and treachery of most of the African tribes, made it a measure of necessary prudence to land with a considerable armed force, and the result has shown the propriety of such precaution, as at almost every place we were received by strong bodies of well armed natives, while we noticed great numbers lurking in the skirts of the neighboring woods.

My orders were in all cases to avoid the effusion of blood, and to fire only in self defence.

This act of retributive justice upon the Little Berriby Tribe will furnish an impressive lesson to the people of other towns suspected of piratical acts, while the friendly demonstrations made by me to those tribes not implicated will go far to show that the American Government greatly prefers a pacific intercourse with all nations, however insignificant, to one of strife.

I am happy in believing that the measures detailed in the accompanying papers will have the effect of establishing, upon a firm and durable basis, a good understanding with all the tribes along the whole coast from Cape Verd to the Equator, and that confidence between the lawful trader and the people at one time suspected of participation in the piracies at Little Berriby, will be restored, and trade, which has been almost entirely suspended, again fall into its former train of profitable results.

It is proper to repeat here what has been more fully mentioned in the documents, that in all my intercourse with the kings and chiefs, I have endeavored to convince them that the American Govern-

ment will be so ready to notice any wrongs committed upon the natives, by persons sailing under the American Flag, as in demanding redress for the aggressions of the natives upon such Americans.

The ships employed in this service, the Macedonian, Saratoga, and Decatur, compose a force rarely seen concentrated upon this part of the coast, and when its avowed object in visiting the various towns was to punish those who committed outrages upon the American citizen and to cultivate a good understanding with those who were disposed to be friendly, the natural conviction of the natives has been that the American Government has gone to unexampled trouble and expense in carrying out its determination to protect the rights of its citizens in this quarter of the world.

In all these measures of no little responsibility and solicitude, I have received the most prompt and efficient aid from Captain Mayo, and Commanders Tattall and Abbott, commanding the ships at present in company, and to Governors Roberts and Russworm, I am also much indebted for advice and council; particularly am I obliged to Governor Roberts, who accompanied me in this ship during her late cruise, and took part in all the deliberations.

The absolute necessity of the sailing of the Saratoga to-night for Port Praya to replenish her provisions, has obliged me to prepare this communication and the accompanying documents in a very hasty manner, in order that they may be sent by her. But I shall take the earliest occasion to transmit duplicates, with some additional information, including a chart of that part of the coast recently visited by the squadron.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. PERRY.

Commanding U. S. Naval Forces,
Western Coast of Africa.Hon. DAVID HENSHAW,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.**ARMY.**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ORDERS, } ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
No. 9. } Washington, March 23, 1844.

I. The rank and file of the several arms of service having fallen below the organization provided by the Act of August 23, 1842, reducing the Military Peace Establishment, the General Recruiting Service will be resumed the 1st of May next.

II. Detail for the General Recruiting Service for 1844:

	Captains.	1st Lieuts.	Total
1st Regiment of Artillery,	-	1	1
3d Do. do.	-	1	1
1st Regiment of Infantry,	-	1	1
2d Do. do.	-	1	1
3d Do. do.	-	1	1
4th Do. do.	-	1	1
5th Do. do.	-	1	1
6th Do. do.	-	1	1
7th Do. do.	-	1	1
8th Do. do.	-	1	1
Regiment of Riflemen,	-	1	1
	2	9	11

III. Commanding officers of regiments will select the captains and subalterns agreeably to the above designation of rank and numbers, in conformity with paragraph 671 General Regulations, who will be directed to report in person to the Superintendent, Lieutenant Colonel Clarke, of the 8th infantry, at New York, on the 1st of May next. The central

depot will be temporarily continued at Fort Columbus.

Captain N. C. Macrae, 3d infantry, now in command of the Newport depot, Ky., will be continued as the captain called for from his regiment.

IV. The extraordinary number of applications made to the Secretary of War, in late years, for the discharge of soldiers on the plea of "minority," accompanied in many cases with affidavits of the fact, renders it necessary to direct the attention of all officers concerned, to the regulations governing the service. They are explicit, and fully sufficient to guard the public interest, and in most cases to prevent imposition, if duly observed by the recruiting officer. And no person should be accepted who does not clearly come within the requirements of the Regulations, (see No. 719,); and not only so, he should be refused, although he may have complied with all the requisitions, if the recruiting officer may have reason to doubt, from appearances, or other cause, that his statements are false.—(See Nos. 681, and 690.)

V. As it is supposed that the "Regimental Recruiting Service" may be conducted with economy and success in some districts of the country, commanders of regiments will apply for the requisite authority when in their opinion, independent rendezvous can be conveniently established, and not too remote from the headquarters and stations of the regiment.

VI. It sometimes happens that discharged soldiers who, for good cause, are refused re-entrance into the service in their former regiments and companies, effect their object at recruiting stations, in consequence of not being known to the recruiting officer. To guard, as far as possible, against such impositions, colonels of regiments will, from time to time, furnish the General Superintendent with lists of all unworthy men discharged from their regiments, who will give the necessary information to the several recruiting officers.

VII. When a suitable hospital steward cannot be obtained from the command, on application of the post surgeon to the commanding officer, the recruiting officer of the station will enlist the person who may be recommended by the medical officer as qualified for such extra duty. The recruit so enlisted, will be assigned to some company, and be accounted for in the same manner as other enlisted soldiers of the army.

VIII. It is ascertained that at several of the posts, the persons enlisted as hospital stewards are not mustered in any company or regiment of the army: wherever this may be the case, the commanding officer of the post will see that their names be immediately taken up upon the company rolls, and that they be mustered, and accounted for in the same manner as other soldiers belonging to the regiment.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT:

R. JONES, *Adj. Gen.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 21, 1844.

Article LXIX, paragraph 687, "GENERAL REGULATIONS FOR THE ARMY," amended:

All free white male persons, above the age of 18, and under 35 years, being at least 5 feet 5 inches in height, who are "effective, able-bodied," men, sober, free from disease, and who have a competent knowledge of the language of the country, may be enlisted. This Regulation, so far as respects the height and age of recruits, shall not extend to musicians, or to soldiers who may "re-enlist" into the service.

WM. WILKINS,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, December 7, 1843.

The regulation of May 12, 1837, amended July 1, 1837, allowing the sum of two dollars to any citizen,

non-commissioned officer, or soldier, for each able-bodied man he may bring to a recruiting rendezvous, and who shall be accepted for the public service, is hereby rescinded.

J. M. PORTER,
Secretary of War.

Extract from Recruiting "CIRCULAR" of February 12, 1842.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, February 12, 1842.

Minors.—No. 689, GENERAL REGULATION.

The Secretary of War directs that, "Instructions should be given to Recruiting officers to exercise more vigilance in ascertaining the age of recruits, and when they are minors, whether they have parents. And they will be held responsible for unauthorized enlistments, which might have been prevented by proper care and attention."

To carry the foregoing instructions into effect, a certificate according to the annexed form will be written on the back of the enlistment in the case of a minor enlisted pursuant to the provisions of the last clause of par. 689, Army Regulations:

"I certify that the within named recruit ———, being a minor, has been carefully questioned by the undersigned, relative to his history, parentage, and age, and that he affirms he has neither parent, guardian, or master, and that his age as recorded in his enlistment is truly given.

"I further certify, that I have also made diligent inquiry in the neighborhood, respecting the said minor, and that in accepting him as a good recruit, lawfully enlisted, I have no reason to suppose that his statement is not true."

and Recruiting Officer.

The daily and unprecedented number of applications for discharges on the plea of illegal enlistments, calls the attention of the Secretary of War to this important interest of the Army—the Recruiting service. It is known that there are instances in which the Recruiting Officer has disregarded the law and the established regulations.

The General Regulations must be observed—all the prescribed duties of the officer, must be literally and strictly performed—and whatever he is enjoined to see executed, or to perform himself, must not be delegated to another.

By order:

R. JONES, *Adj. Gen.*

Marriage.

At St. Louis, on the 19th ult., Lieut. DOUGLAS S. IRWIN, 3d regiment of U. S. Infantry, to SARAH, eldest daughter of Dr. BEAUMONT.

Deaths.

On Thursday afternoon, March 28, at half past 3 o'clock, aged 65 years, Commodore E. PENDLETON KENNEDY, of the United States Navy, after a short but very severe attack of paralysis. He was at the time of his demise in command of the ship-of-the-line Pennsylvania, the flag ship of the squadron afloat on the Norfolk station. He has left a wife and six children to mourn the loss of an affectionate husband and father, and the country has sustained the loss of a brave and gallant officer.

At New Brunswick, N. J., on the 28th ult., Capt ABRAHAM S. TEN EICK, U. S. Navy, in the 58th year of his age.

At Fort Monroe, on the 26th ult., Surgeon EDWARD MACOMB, U. S. Army, aged 42 years.